The KULA Paper
The public economic spec for the PRANA / KULA economy.
1 · The see-saw compute model
PRANA is an Ethash/Etchash-style EVM chain (core-geth fork), fair-launch, no premine. Beyond block reward and a sealed-at-genesis 2.00% protocol fee, its security budget comes from a useful-work settlement pot split across two lanes that draw from one fixed per-epoch pot, pro-rata across all verified work-shares:
- HASH lane — ordinary proof-of-work hashing, deliberately thin: enough to anchor the
chain's ordering and liveness, not the whole reward. Credited by
HashLaneCreditor. - TASK / AI-work lane — verified, redundantly-recomputed AI and compute jobs, credited only
after passing a verification gate (
TaskVerificationGate) that guards against fabricated work. Credited byTaskLaneCreditor.
Both lanes write shares into one ledger (UnifiedSharesLedger) that pays the pot pro-rata.
Because they share one pot, they see-saw: early on, hash-shares dominate; as real AI-work
arrives, task-shares grow and catch up — pulling reward toward useful work with no re-minting and
no schedule change. Hashing is the thin security floor; useful work is the intended long-run majority.
Attesters who sign off on bad work are slashed; the cheapest way to earn the pot is to do the work.
| Parameter | Value | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
epochLength | 3600 s | one settlement epoch = 1 hour |
windowEpochs | 3 | rolling window the pot averages over |
epochIssuance | 1000 · 10¹⁸ | fixed pot minted per epoch, split pro-rata |
burnWeight | 1 · 10¹⁸ | weight of burn-credited shares in the split |
coordinatorMinBond | 1000 · 10¹⁸ | bond a job coordinator must post |
attestorMinStake | 100 · 10¹⁸ | stake an attester must post (slashable) |
2 · KULA — the reward / DeFi token
KULA (0x32255D0138f5D645894FA89b5D5B5a68cF9Aa631) is the token the
DeFi economy revolves around — the MasterChef/ve pattern, honestly parameterised.
- Emission-only. No premine, no treasury allocation. KULA is minted only by the
EmissionScheduler(soleMINTER_ROLE); the deployer holds no minter role. Admin is the DAO Timelock (2-day delay); the deployer renounced admin. - Supply. ~1,000,000 KULA in year one, decaying −10% per year. That geometric series sums to roughly 10M lifetime; the contract enforces a hard cap of 11M the schedule never reaches. A faucet with a decay, not a tap a person can open wider.
- The split. Each emission is divided 45% miners / 35% LPs / 10% lottery / 10% stakers. An hourly keeper computes what is due, applies the decay, routes each slice to its sink, and defers rather than dumping when all sinks are empty.
| Miners | 45% | useful-work providers (the see-saw of §1) — the biggest slice on purpose |
| LPs | 35% | streamed by the LiquidityGauge to KULA/WPRANA liquidity providers |
| Lottery | 10% | seeds the NoLossLotto prize pot |
| Stakers | 10% | real-yield to KULA stakers via DividendDistributor |
KULA is also the CDP collateral (§6) and the asset locked for veKULA boost + votes (§5). The off-chain
model that tunes these parameters before they are pinned on-chain lives in
kulaswap/kula-farm.mjs.
3 · MWALI — the proof-of-liquidity token
MWALI (0x36C6921e2CECe9DEc7a5AAC42bC6738011F2a1c9) is the
liquidity token — KULA is not. It rewards and measures the liquidity that backs KULA.
- Minted only by the gauge. MWALI's sole
MINTER_ROLEholder is theLiquidityGauge_KULA_WPRANA, which mints MWALI to liquidity providers of the KULA/WPRANA pair — the Kula-Ring pairing that ties MWALI issuance to real, on-chain liquidity depth. - Emission-only, no human minter. The deployer holds no
MINTER_ROLE; admin is the DAO Timelock; the deployer renounced admin. MWALI cannot be printed by a person. - Why a separate token. Proof-of-Liquidity (Berachain's idea, adapted) separates the reward for providing liquidity (MWALI) from the reward token itself (KULA), so liquidity is a first-class, measurable, governance-relevant position rather than a side effect.
4 · APIS — the MELEK-Engine fee token
APIS is the fee/utility token of MELEK-Engine, the Hive-Engine-style side-token layer for the MELEK Graphene chain (the "BEE" analogue) — burned to create tokens and pay engine resource fees. You earn it by the WorkerBee mechanic, re-mapped:
- Forever-lock wMELEK. Wrapped MELEK, once bridged to PRANA, can be forever-locked (no unstake) into the mine.
- Soulbound APIS-Hash. A forever-lock mints APIS-Hash, a non-transferable mining-power unit — the staked-WORKERBEE equivalent.
- Mine APIS. APIS-Hash drips APIS forever at your stake-weighted share of emission. It is not a loan: no debt, no liquidation, no cycle risk.
The canonical off-chain mechanics live in kulaswap/apis-workerbee.mjs; the engine layer in
engine/README.md.
5 · veKULA — lock for boost + governance
Locking KULA into the VoteEscrow (max lock 4 years) mints veKULA, the
Curve-style vote-escrow position, which grants a yield boost (up to ~2.5×), vote weight to
steer gauge emissions via the GaugeController, and dividend eligibility for the
staker slice. veKULA decays as the lock ages, so voting power reflects ongoing commitment.
6 · CDP — lock KULA, borrow mMELEK
The CDPVault lets a KULA holder lock KULA and borrow a synthetic
MelekBorrowNote ("mMELEK") at 50% LTV, priced by a SimplePriceOracle. Two
safety choices: (1) mMELEK is not the bridge wMELEK — the CDP mints its own synthetic so the
bridge invariant (wMELEK supply == MELEK locked) is never touched by borrowing; (2) MelekBorrowNote's
sole minter is the vault, admin is the DAO Timelock, deployer renounced admin.
7 · Sinks — lottery, burn-mine, dividends
Every emission is paired with a sink so the faucet can run indefinitely:
- No-loss lottery (
NoLossLotto) — PoolTogether model: principal stays safe, yield plus the 10% KULA slice and a cut of fees funds prizes. Upside without risking capital. - BurnMine — burn proof-of-liquidity into KULA at a fixed ratio, plus a burn-to-enter raffle
variant; a curated
BurnMineHubhosts many burn contracts, each minting a curated output; the hub itself never mints. - Dividends (
DividendDistributor, stakers + miners) — stake KULA, receive a pro-rata share of real fee yield.
The design rule is explicit (MintSinkGuard in the contract set): every emission has a
paired sink. That is what keeps a reward token from becoming a pure inflation machine.
8 · The bridge
MELEK (Graphene L1) connects to PRANA (EVM) through the GrapheneDepositBridge. MELEK locked
on the Graphene side mints wMELEK on PRANA; burning wMELEK releases MELEK. A federated validator set
(5 validators, 3-of-5 threshold) authorises mints. The core invariant is wMELEK supply ==
MELEK locked — exactly why the CDP mints a separate synthetic instead of more wMELEK. The same
wrapper pattern extends to wVKBT and wCURE.
9 · The arcade — non-cashable PLAY
The KULA Arcade runs on a non-cashable PLAY token. This is a hard compliance line, not a marketing choice: arcade play is a free, provably-fair, non-cashable play-token surface — never a wager, never a cash-out, geofenced, behind an education layer. Real-money mechanics are out of scope and stay behind counsel. Gambling education (house edge, RTP, −EV, responsible-gambling help on every page) is a separate surface.
10 · Governance & custody posture
- No human minter. KULA, MWALI, and MelekBorrowNote are all emission-only; their minter roles belong to contracts (EmissionScheduler, the gauge, the CDP vault), never to a person.
- DAO Timelock. Admin over the token set is the DAO Timelock with a 2-day delay; the deployer renounced admin on each token.
- Keys. The emission keeper fetches its signing key just-in-time and never writes it to disk. No key material appears in this repo or on any public surface.
- Source, verifiable. The mainnet contracts are being verified on the PRANA block explorer (Blockscout) so any third party can read the exact source behind every address below.
11 · Canonical mainnet addresses (PRANA, chainId 712217)
kulaswap/kula-farm.mjs, kulaswap/apis-workerbee.mjs,
kulaswap/kula-cdp.mjs, engine/README.md, and the mainnet deploy record.
The full markdown is KULA_PAPER.md in the repo.
Parameters here are the ones live at publication; governance can change any of them.